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Individual pension accounts are growing in importance as a pillar of retirement 
incomes policy in the developed world. Policy-makers have generally assumed that 
by introducing pre-funded pension schemes, they can increase household wealth 
and thereby raise retirement incomes. However, there has been relatively little 
empirical work to confirm this. This paper focuses on the effect of Australia’s 
system of compulsory pension accounts, the ‘Superannuation Guarantee’, on 
household saving behaviour. 
Microeconomic data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in 
Australia (HILDA) Survey, are used to explore three related questions: 
i.   Have compulsory pension accounts increased household wealth? 
ii.   What effect do compulsory pension accounts have on voluntary saving for 
retirement? 
iii.  Do compulsory pension accounts influence the timing of retirement? 
This paper finds that Australia’s compulsory pension accounts increased household 
wealth. Voluntary saving for retirement in pension accounts also appeared to 
increase slightly, possibly due to the added convenience of being able to make 
contributions directly into these pension accounts. Finally, there is no evidence of a 
significant effect on retirement intentions. Overall, the results suggest that 
Australia’s compulsory pension accounts have increased household wealth and 
raised self-funded retirement incomes. 
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THE EFFECT OF THE AUSTRALIAN SUPERANNUATION 
GUARANTEE ON HOUSEHOLD SAVING BEHAVIOUR 
Ellis Connolly 
1.  Introduction 
Individual pension accounts are growing in importance as a pillar of retirement 
incomes policy in developed economies. However, the framework adopted differs 
from country to country. Australia, Sweden and Switzerland have introduced 
compulsory accounts, while in the United Kingdom employees automatically 
receive accounts with an option to opt-out. At the same time, the debate on social 
security reform in the United States centres on whether funds should be diverted 
into individual accounts. Policy-makers around the world have generally assumed 
that introducing such pre-funded pension schemes improves retirement incomes 
and increases household wealth. However, there has been relatively little empirical 
work that tests this assumption. 
This paper focuses on the effect that Australia’s system of compulsory pension 
accounts (the ‘Superannuation Guarantee’) has had on household saving. This 
scheme, which was introduced over 1986–1992, requires employers to pay a 
percentage of their employees’ earnings into individual pension accounts.1 The 
accounts are managed by private sector pension funds and cannot be accessed until 
the employee retires after the age of 55.2 The initial contribution rate was set at  
3 per cent of labour income in 1986 and gradually increased to 9 per cent by 2002. 
The scheme has raised pension plan coverage from around 40 per cent of the 
workforce in 1983 to 90 per cent since the mid 1990s.3 
Australia’s system provides a natural experiment since a small share of employees 
do not receive employer contributions to pension accounts. As a result, it is 
                                           
1  The initial scheme was known as Award Superannuation from June 1986. The broader 
Superannuation Guarantee scheme was introduced in July 1992. 
2  The Preservation Age is 55 for persons born before 1 July 1960 and rises to 60 for persons 
born after 30 June 1964. 
3  For a more comprehensive description of retirement incomes policy in Australia, see Edey 
and Gower (2000), Connolly and Kohler (2004) and Bateman and Kingston (forthcoming). 
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possible to compare households that received contributions with those that did not. 
Using data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia 
(HILDA) Survey, this paper attempts to answer three related questions: 
i.  Have compulsory pension accounts increased household wealth? 
ii.  What effect do compulsory pension accounts have on voluntary saving for 
retirement? 
iii.  Do compulsory pension accounts influence the timing of retirement? 
Turning to the first question, compulsory pension accounts will raise wealth if 
households do not increase consumption to fully offset the growth of their pension 
accounts. In a life-cycle model with no financial constraints, households who view 
their pension accounts as perfect substitutes for other assets would reduce those 
other assets (or, if need be, borrow) so as to offset compulsory contributions to 
their pension accounts, leaving their net wealth unchanged. However, if some 
households are financially constrained, they may not be able to do this. 
Furthermore, households might not view their pension accounts as perfect 
substitutes for other forms of saving. For instance, households may value the 
balance in their retirement account less than a more liquid investment if they are 
financially constrained. Finally, tax incentives could lead households to voluntarily 
save a higher share of their wealth in pension accounts, although the effect on net 
wealth is theoretically ambiguous due to offsetting income and substitution effects. 
While this first question has not been addressed directly in the literature, there are 
several related findings. When the scheme was introduced, the Australian 
Government projected that for every dollar contributed to the pension accounts, 
other savings would fall (be ‘offset’) by 30 to 50 cents. Using macroeconomic 
data, Connolly and Kohler (2004) find that the offset is likely to be in this range, 
with a point estimate of 38 cents. However, the balance in pension accounts 
reflects not only contributions, but investment returns. Dvornak and Kohler (2007) 
examine the effect of increases in wealth (including investment returns) on 
consumption, although they do not examine the impact of compulsory pension 
accounts in particular. According to Dvornak and Kohler, a one dollar increase in 
stock market wealth (including pension accounts) results in consumption rising by 
between six and nine cents. Since compulsory pension account balances reflect 
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both contributions and investment returns, these two papers can provide us with 
reasonable upper- and lower-bound estimates of the effect of the accounts on 
household wealth. One could expect that compulsory pension accounts would 
increase wealth by between 62 cents in the dollar (the effect of compulsory pension 
contributions in Connolly and Kohler) and 94 cents in the dollar (the effect of 
stock market wealth in Dvornak and Kohler). Broadly consistent with this, 
aggregate pension (superannuation) assets have increased significantly over the 
past two decades, rising by almost 100 percentage points as a share of household 
income, while financial assets and total net wealth have increased by around 130 
and 230 percentage points respectively as a share of household income (Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Household Wealth 
Ratio to household disposable income 
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Sources: ABS;  RBA 
For the purpose of analysing retirement incomes, it is possible to decompose 
household saving into three parts: compulsory pension contributions, voluntary 
pension contributions and non-pension saving. In answering the second question 
above, I define voluntary retirement saving as making voluntary contributions to 
pension accounts, where these funds cannot be accessed until retirement.4 
                                           
4  Non-pension saving can also be consumed in retirement. However, only contributions to 
pension accounts are guaranteed to be for the purpose of retirement saving, as a result of the 
preservation rules. 
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Compulsory pension accounts will only increase retirement incomes if households 
do not reduce their voluntary retirement saving in response. Since compulsory and 
voluntary pension contributions are close substitutes, households could be 
expected to reduce their voluntary contributions in response to an increase in 
compulsory contributions. On the other hand, the implementation of a compulsory 
pension account scheme might actually increase voluntary saving for retirement by 
shifting household preferences. For instance, if these accounts alert households to 
the importance of retirement planning, then they may choose to save more for 
retirement (Mariger 1997 and Elmendorf and Liebman 2000 make similar 
arguments in the context of the US debate on pension reform). Furthermore, by 
automatically providing households with pension accounts, the compulsory system 
may make it more convenient for them to save.5 Some employers also provide 
employees with saving incentives such as matched contributions. In aggregate, 
total contributions to pension accounts (including voluntary contributions) have 
increased since 1986, broadly in line with the rising compulsory contribution rate 
(Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Contributions to Pension Accounts 
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5  This is analogous to the finding of Madrian and Shea (2001) that households are more likely 
to save in 401(k) accounts in the US if they are automatically enrolled by their employer. 
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The third question is whether compulsory pension accounts could also influence 
the timing of retirement. If contributions are not completely offset by reductions in 
other saving, households with compulsory pension accounts will accumulate more 
wealth as they approach retirement than households without accounts. Assuming 
that leisure is a normal good, these households would prefer to retire early 
(Freebairn 2004). However, Samwick (1998) and Gustman and Steinmeier (2001) 
find that the level of wealth has only a small effect on the retirement decision. 
Compulsory pension accounts could also influence the retirement decision by 
emphasising to households the importance of retirement planning, encouraging 
them to work longer to achieve an acceptable standard of living in retirement. In 
aggregate, the labour force participation rate of persons aged 55 to 64 has been 
increasing since 1986, mainly due to higher female participation, but also due to a 
recent turnaround in male participation among this age group (Figure 3). It is worth 
noting, however, that since the analysis in this paper is based on data for the   
2002 to 2003 period, it says nothing about any effects on saving and retirement 
behaviour associated with the changes to superannuation announced in the   
2006 Budget. 
Figure 3: Participation Rate of 55–64 Age Group 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, the methodology 
is outlined; in Section 3, the dataset is introduced; in Section 4 the results are 
analysed; and the conclusions are drawn in Section 5. 
2.  Methodology 
2.1  Identification Strategy 
The aim is to estimate the effect of compulsory pension accounts on household 
wealth, retirement saving and the timing of retirement. Australia’s system provides 
a natural experiment, as around 8 per cent of employees did not receive employer 
contributions to pension accounts in August 2002 (ABS 2003b). Therefore, 
households that received contributions can be compared with those that did not. 
The main exemptions from making compulsory contributions are for the employers 
of individuals earning less than $450 per month, those under 18 years of age who 
work less than 30 hours a week and certain jobs such as transport drivers, 
household employees and providers of child care in the home.6 Those who are not 
remunerated as employees, such as independent contractors and the self-employed, 
are also exempt. Finally, there may be a small percentage of employers who are 
avoiding making contributions despite being legally required to do so. Such 
employers are likely to be part of the underground economy, which the   
ABS (2003a) has estimated to be up to 2 per cent of GDP. 
The key assumption underlying the identification strategy is that the decision of the 
Government and employers as to whether employees receive compulsory pension 
contributions is exogenous with respect to the employees’ unobserved taste for 
saving, after controlling for covariates. This assumption is analogous to the 401(k) 
eligibility experiment of Poterba, Venti and Wise (1996) for the US, where it was 
assumed that employers choose whether their employees are eligible to contribute 
to a 401(k) plan. It is then possible to measure the effect of eligibility by 
comparing eligible employees to ineligible employees. 
                                           
6  Some persons in the following occupations may not receive pension contributions: artists, 
painters, photographers, journalists, transport drivers, army reservists and child care and 
personal services workers in the home (who work for not more than 30 hours per week). 
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One way to test the validity of this identification strategy would be to compare the 
two groups before the introduction of compulsory pension accounts. Unfortunately, 
the data required to conduct such an analysis are not available for Australia. 
Instead, the subjective saving behaviour of both groups can be examined 
subsequent to the introduction of compulsory pension accounts. I find that the two 
groups have similar reasons for saving, horizons for saving and appetites for risk 
(see Appendix A, Table A1).7 However, if compulsory pension accounts were to 
fundamentally alter household saving behaviour, then comparing the two groups 
after the introduction of the accounts may not reflect their behaviour in the absence 
of such accounts. 
The obvious violation of this identification assumption is the self-employment 
exemption. The self-employed may choose not to remunerate their household as 
‘employees’ so as to avoid having to pay (and receive) compulsory pension 
contributions. This decision could be correlated with their unobserved taste for 
saving. I control for this in several ways: employers and own-account workers are 
excluded from the sample; and for persons who are employees of their own 
business, self-employment is included as a covariate and also interacted with the 
variable measuring whether or not households receive compulsory pension 
contributions. 
2.2  Household Wealth 
To measure the effect of compulsory pension accounts on wealth, I estimate the 
following regression: 
  1 1 1 1 i i i i X R Y
W ε γ β α + + + =  (1) 
where: 
i Y
W  is a measure of the wealth-to-income ratio; Ri is a dummy variable 
that takes the value 1 if household i receives compulsory pension contributions and 
0 otherwise; Xi is a matrix of covariates; α1, β1 and γ1 are parameters; and εi1 is an 
independent and identically distributed error term. I estimate the effect on the 
                                           
7  Pence (2002) conducted a very similar exercise for 401(k) participants, but with the added 
advantage of access to subjective saving behaviour data that pre-dated the widespread 
adoption of 401(k)s. She concluded that participation in 401(k)s did not appear to 
fundamentally alter saving behaviour. 
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wealth-to-income ratio since compulsory contributions to pension accounts should 
be proportional to labour income. If compulsory contributions have a positive 
effect on the wealth-to-income ratio, then β1>0. To reduce the influence of outliers 
in the wealth distribution on the estimates, median regression is used with 
bootstrapped standard errors. 
To obtain an estimate of the effect of a marginal increase in compulsory pension 
account balances on household wealth, I estimate the following regression 
specification: 
  2 2 2 2 i i i i X A W ε γ β α + + + =  (2) 
where:  Ai is an estimate of the value of the compulsory pension account of 
household i; and β2 is a parameter that measures the marginal effect of a dollar of 
saving in compulsory pension accounts on net wealth. 
2.3  Voluntary Saving for Retirement 
The decision of households to make voluntary contributions to their pension 
accounts can be modelled as a function of whether they receive compulsory 
pension account contributions: 
  () ( ) 3 3 3 , | 1 γ β α i i i i i X R G X R V P + + = =  (3) 
where Vi takes the value 1 if household i makes voluntary contributions and 0 
otherwise. Since Vi is a dummy variable, this regression is estimated as a probit 
model, where G is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. If β3>0, 
there is a positive relationship between employers making compulsory 
contributions and employees making voluntary contributions (and vice versa if 
β3<0). Since the magnitudes of the coefficients in a probit model have no 
straightforward economic interpretation, marginal effects (the estimated changes in 
the probability in response to changes in regressors) are reported. 
The magnitude of the effect on voluntary saving for retirement can also be 
modelled using data on the share of income that households voluntarily contribute 
to their pension accounts as the regressand. In this case, Vi is continuous, but has a 
lower threshold of 0 per cent, since households cannot make withdrawals from 
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their retirement accounts prior to retirement. Hence a tobit model is estimated and 
marginal effects are reported. If the marginal effect is greater than zero, then 
compulsory accounts result in employees making larger voluntary contributions. 
2.4  Retirement Intentions 
Since Australia’s compulsory pension accounts policy has only been operating 
fully since 1992, it is too early to estimate the effect of compulsory accounts on 
retirement outcomes. Instead, to obtain some preliminary evidence, I estimate the 
effect on the retirement intentions of working household members aged over 45. 
There are two variables that can be analysed. First, it is possible to examine 
whether household members actually have an intended age of retirement: 
  ( ) ( ) 4 4 4 , | 1 γ β α i i i i i
e X R G X R R P + + = =  (4) 
where   takes the value 1 if at least one household member aged over 45 has an 
intended retirement age and 0 otherwise. Whether household members have an 
intended retirement age could be considered a partial indicator of the extent to 
which the household has engaged in retirement planning. If β4>0, then compulsory 
pension accounts increase the likelihood that households have an intended age of 
retirement. 
e
i R
Second, the effect on the average intended age of retirement can be examined (for 
those households where at least one person specified an intended retirement age): 
   (5)  5 5 5 5 i i i i
e X R R ε γ β α + + + =
where   is the average intended age of retirement of working household 
members over the age of 45. If β5<0, then compulsory accounts encourage early 
retirement. 
e
i R
2.5  Controlling for Other Factors Affecting Saving 
The aim is to develop a model of saving behaviour where, after controlling for 
covariates, the decision of the government and employers as to whether households 
receive compulsory pension contributions is exogenous with respect to households’ 
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unobserved taste for saving.8 Therefore, in the matrix of covariates, Xi, I include: 
household income, age, gender and health condition of the household head, which 
affect saving through the permanent-income and life-cycle hypotheses; whether 
someone in the household is self-employed; the industry in which the household 
head works, since institutional arrangements for pensions differ by industry; and 
the subjective job insecurity of the household head, to control for the fact that 
households not receiving pension contributions are more likely to be casually 
employed or on contract, and may have a greater precautionary motive for saving. 
Other covariates typically used in wealth regressions are also included: the 
education level of the household head, as an indicator of human capital and 
possibly of financial sophistication; the marital status of the household head and 
family size, which can affect households’ saving; location, which is an important 
explanator of property value; and the number of years the household head has 
spent in the workforce, which controls for households’ exposure to pension 
account accumulation and income flows.9 Where a covariate is a continuous 
variable (such as age and income), it is specified using a quadratic form (with a 
linear and a squared term) to allow for potential non-linearities. 
3.  Data 
This paper uses the confidentialised unit record dataset from the HILDA Survey 
(Release 3.0), a household-based panel study that began in 2001 from a reference 
population of all members of private dwellings in Australia. Wave 1 of the panel 
consisted of 7  682 households and 19  914 individuals. In Wave 2, conducted 
between 21 August 2002 and 19 March 2003, a special module collected 
comprehensive and detailed wealth data from each household. The key question 
that measures whether households receive compulsory pension contributions is: 
‘Does your employer/business make contributions into a superannuation scheme 
on your behalf?’ 
                                           
8  Ideally, I would also model intra-household decisions, since the employment experiences and 
characteristics of different household members could affect household saving. However, 
many components of wealth have only been surveyed on a household basis, so the modelling 
of intra-household decisions is beyond the scope of this paper. 
9  See, for example, Poterba et al (1996) and Pence (2001). 
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Table 1 displays characteristics for five different samples to allow separate analysis 
of the effect of the reform for low-income and high-income households and to 
determine whether the presence of financial constraints is important, as theory 
would suggest. The first sample is the full sample, which includes all households 
where the household head is aged below 65 years and where someone in the 
household is employed and either receives or does not receive compulsory pension 
contributions.10 The second sample is a subset of this full sample, including only 
households with below-median incomes, while the third sample includes only 
those with above-median incomes. The fourth sample is based on the full sample, 
but is limited to households where the household head indicated that they are 
financially constrained, following the definition in La Cava and Simon (2003).11 
The fifth sample includes all non-financially constrained households. I analyse 
financially constrained households separately since they are likely to have greater 
difficulty offsetting compulsory saving in pension accounts. Selecting households 
on this basis may also help to reduce unobserved heterogeneity, since households 
facing financial constraints may share saving behaviours that cannot otherwise be 
observed. 
Around 6.5 per cent of households in the full sample do not receive compulsory 
pension contributions. This is broadly consistent with ABS estimates of the 
proportion of employees not covered by the system. By income, the proportion not 
covered ranges from 9.6 per cent for below-median-income households to 3.4 per 
cent for above-median-income households. The latter group is quite small, so 
results for the above-median-income sample should be interpreted with a greater 
degree of caution. 
                                           
10 This excludes households for which no definitive answer was given to the question of whether 
employer contributions were made. The household head is defined as the most important 
provider of income. A hierarchy of characteristics is used to determine the household head:  
i. income; ii. labour income; iii. labour force status; and iv. age, with characteristics lower 
down the hierarchy only used in case of a tie between household members. 
11 The financially constrained are defined as responding ‘yes’ to any of the following questions: 
having difficulty raising $2 000 in an emergency (for example, would need to borrow funds, 
sell an asset or could not raise the funds); difficulty paying utility bills on time; difficulty 
paying mortgage/rent on time; pawned or sold something; went without meals; was unable to 
heat home; asked for financial help from friends or family. 
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Table 1: Characteristics of Samples 
 Full   
sample 
Below- 
median  
income 
Above- 
median  
income 
Financially 
constrained 
Non-
financially 
constrained
No compulsory pension 
contributions (per cent) 
 6.5    9.6    3.4    8.0    4.8 
Median household  
disposable income ($) 
  49 705    33 398    70 145    46 520    54 239 
Age of household head (years)   40    38    42    39    41 
Makes voluntary super 
contributions (per cent) 
 36.8    24.3    49.4    32.1    42.2 
Median net financial  
wealth ($) 
  73 630    37 060    127 250    49 830    108 000 
Median net wealth ($)    223 100    106 734    390 500    155 613    333 700 
Number of households    4 379    2 190    2 189    2 336    2 043 
Source:  HILDA Survey, Release 3.0 
 
Two measures of net wealth are considered in this paper. The narrow definition of 
wealth includes financial wealth (‘net financial wealth’); while the broad definition 
also includes business equity and housing equity (‘net wealth’).12 Since private 
businesses and houses are rarely traded, the accuracy of business and housing 
equity data is likely to be lower than it is for financial assets data, where prices are 
updated by financial markets. The narrow measure is equivalent to the net financial 
wealth measure used in the 401(k) literature by Poterba et al (1996). The two 
wealth measures are also constructed including and excluding pension assets so 
that the effect of receiving compulsory pension contributions can be broken into 
the effect on pension assets and the effect on other assets. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to measure directly the size of each household’s 
compulsory pension account, C, since most households are also allowed to make 
voluntary contributions into the same account. Instead, I construct an estimate by 
taking the wages and salaries of employees who reported receiving pension 
contributions and extrapolate it back to 1992, when the Superannuation Guarantee 
was introduced, using data on average earnings by industry from the ABS. I then 
obtain the compulsory pension contributions by multiplying wages and salaries in 
each year by the contribution rate in that particular year, adjusting for the taxation 
                                           
12 Housing/business equity is defined as housing/business assets minus housing/business debts.  
 13 
of contributions. If the employees report that they were employed for less than  
10 years (the length of time since the Superannuation Guarantee was introduced), I 
assume contributions have only been made for the number of years that they have 
been employed. I then cumulate the contributions into a stock using aggregate 
pension fund investment returns data adjusted for the taxation of investment 
income. 
Job mobility is a potential source of measurement error in our estimates since we 
can only observe whether contributions were being made when respondents were 
surveyed during 2002/03. Nevertheless, as long as employees move between jobs 
where their contributions status remains unchanged, our measure remains sound. In 
the full sample, the household head spent, on average, 7.3 years in their current job 
(the median time was 4 years). However, the average period that the household 
head spent in the same occupation was 10.2 years while the median was 7 years. 
Assuming that jobs in the same occupation would be likely to offer similar 
working conditions, then job mobility may not be such a large source of 
measurement error. Furthermore, since the contribution rate gradually increased 
over the 1990s from 3 per cent to 9 per cent, wages in earlier years receive less 
weight in estimates of pension account balances. 
3.1  Compulsory Pension Coverage 
The bulk of the households not receiving compulsory pension contributions appear 
to fall into at least one of the exemptions. The first five rows of Table 2 show the 
percentage of the sample that fall within the exemptions. Another indicator of 
whether households are exempt is if tax is withheld from income. Employees who 
earn below the tax-free threshold do not need to have income tax withheld and are 
exempt, along with independent contractors and the self-employed, who are not 
remunerated through wages and salaries. Cumulatively, the exemptions appear to 
cover 77.5 per cent of the households where no working household members 
receive compulsory pension contributions. 
The remaining households that do not receive compulsory pension contributions 
may have jobs in the underground economy. These households represent 1.4 per 
cent of the full sample, consistent with estimates of the size of the underground 
economy. Drawing on research by the ABS (2003a), I can identify several factors 
that may be correlated with such jobs, including: no leave entitlements or an 
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impermanent contract; small workplaces; or service industries where remuneration 
outside the tax system may be more prevalent.13 Cumulatively, 97.8 per cent of the 
households not receiving compulsory pension contributions can be explained by 
the exemptions or the factors correlated with jobs in the underground economy. 
Table 2: Explaining Compulsory Pension Coverage 
Characteristics of the household head 
  No compulsory pension 
contributions
(a) 
Compulsory pension 
contributions
(b) 
 Probit model of 
coverage 
  Per cent  Cumulative
(per cent) 
Per cent  Cumulative 
(per cent) 
 Marginal effect
(c)
(per cent) 
Labour income less than 
$450 per month  
47.5 47.5  7.9  7.9    –3.6*** 
Self-employed   20.8  58.5  6.6  13.2    –5.1*** 
Under 18 and working 
fewer than 30 hours/week 
1.1 58.8  0.0 13.2    –25.5* 
Work in industry with 
exemption 
5.6 62.0  5.3 17.9    –0.2 
Income tax not withheld 
or not receiving 
wage/salary 
59.9 77.5  8.2 19.2    –16.7*** 
No leave entitlements or 
impermanent contract 
55.6 94.7 22.9 38.3    –10.2*** 
Fewer than 20 workers in 
workplace 
71.1 96.5 38.1 55.7    –0.9* 
Service industries with 
low coverage rates  
52.1 97.8 26.8 63.6    –1.7*** 
Pseudo R
2           32.6 
Notes:  *** and * represent significance at the 1 and 10 per cent levels, respectively, for the test of the underlying 
coefficient being 0. 
  (a) 6.5 per cent of full sample 
  (b) 93.5 per cent of full sample 
  (c) The marginal effect is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
Source:  HILDA Survey, Release 3.0 
 
                                           
13 As measured by the ABS, the industries with lower employer superannuation coverage are: 
agriculture, forestry & fishing, construction, retail trade, hospitality, cultural & recreational 
services and personal & other services. 
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A probit model confirms that most of the factors in Table 2 significantly reduce the 
probability that the household will receive compulsory pension contributions. The 
only factor that is statistically insignificant is ‘work in an industry with 
exemption’. This result may be due to employment-by-industry data not being 
sufficiently disaggregated to distinguish the exemptions accurately. Even so, many 
households not receiving compulsory pension contributions have similar 
characteristics to those who do: 64 per cent of the households receiving 
contributions share at least one of the characteristics listed in Table 2. This can 
give us some confidence that households not receiving compulsory pension 
contributions represent a reasonable control group, since they do not appear to be 
intrinsically different from many of the households receiving contributions. 
4.  Empirical Results 
4.1  Household Wealth 
Table 3 presents the results for the estimated median effect of receiving 
compulsory pension contributions on the wealth-to-income ratio (Equation (1)). 
For the full sample, receiving contributions significantly increases the net financial 
wealth-to-income ratio by 20.3 per cent of income. When I disaggregate this into 
the contribution from pension assets and other assets, the effect is mainly due to an 
increase in pension assets of 15.8 per cent of income. Households do not appear to 
be offsetting the increase in pension assets by reducing other financial wealth, 
since the point estimate for the effect on non-pension assets is positive (4.4 per 
cent) and statistically insignificant. When business and housing equity are added to 
obtain a measure of total net wealth, the results are not statistically significant but 
the effect is still economically sizeable, at 46.7 per cent of income. 
The results for the sub-samples show that the effect of receiving contributions on 
the financial wealth-to-income ratio is positive and generally significant at the 
10 per cent level. For below-median-income households, the effect on financial 
wealth is 21.1 per cent of income and appears to be dominated by an implied effect 
on pension assets of 17.4 percentage points. When the net wealth-to-income ratio 
is used, the results are insignificant for the sub-samples. While it is likely that net 
wealth is measured less accurately than financial wealth, reducing the precision of 
our estimates, the effect of receiving contributions on net wealth is economically 
significant for all the samples. The point estimates are larger for below-median-
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income and financially constrained households than when net financial wealth is 
used, however, the differences are not likely to be statistically significant. 
Table 3: Effect of Compulsory Pension Contributions on  
Household Net Wealth to Gross Income Ratio 
  Full  
sample 
Below-
median 
income 
Above-
median 
income 
Financially 
constrained 
Non-
financially 
constrained 
Net financial wealth           
Including assets in 
pension accounts 
20.3** 
(10.0) 
21.1* 
(11.5) 
61.2** 
(30.0) 
15.9 
(10.1) 
56.4* 
(30.4) 
Excluding assets in 
pension accounts 
4.4 
(5.3) 
3.8 
(5.3) 
14.7 
(14.7) 
3.7 
(5.0) 
9.6 
(16.0) 
Implied effect on 
pension assets 
15.8 17.4  46.5  12.2 46.8 
Net wealth           
Including assets in 
pension accounts 
46.7 
(28.7) 
36.1 
(36.3) 
59.8 
(65.1) 
20.9 
(31.0) 
55.3 
(52.0) 
Excluding assets in 
pension accounts 
4.2 
(20.0) 
14.9 
(29.8) 
11.2 
(44.5) 
–10.6 
(25.7) 
54.7 
(54.8) 
Implied effect on 
pension assets 
42.5 21.2  48.6  31.6  0.6 
Notes:  Standard errors are in brackets. ** and * represent significance at the 5 and 10 per cent levels,
respectively. Top-coded net wealth and gross income observations have been excluded. 
 
While the results in Table 3 suggest that compulsory pension contributions have a 
positive effect on net wealth, they only provide an imprecise estimate of the 
magnitude of the effect. More precise estimates of the marginal effect of a dollar of 
compulsory pension assets on household wealth can be obtained by estimating 
Equation (2), with the results presented in Table 4.14 Overall, the results suggest 
that marginal increases in compulsory pension account balances largely flow 
through to increases in household wealth. For the full sample, an extra dollar in 
compulsory pension accounts increases net financial wealth by 91 cents, 
suggesting an offset of only 9  cents through reductions in other assets. This 
appears to occur mainly through reductions in non-pension financial wealth, which 
falls by a statistically significant 19 cents; it should be noted that the equivalent 
coefficient in Table 3 was positive, though insignificant. When the broadest 
                                           
14 See Appendix A, Table A4 for the complete set of estimates from the net financial wealth 
model for the full sample. 
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measure of wealth is used, there does not appear to be evidence of any offset, with 
household saving increasing by 133 cents for every extra dollar in compulsory 
superannuation. While this point estimate implies that pension assets increase by 
more than a dollar in response to an extra dollar of compulsory pension assets 
(partly offset by a reduction in non-pension financial wealth), this estimate is not 
significantly different from 1. In other words, the results for the broader measure of 
net wealth are once again imprecisely estimated and should be treated with a high 
degree of caution. 
Table 4: Marginal Effect of Compulsory Contributions on Household Wealth
Net wealth as a per cent of gross household income 
 Full   
sample 
Below-
median 
income 
Above-
median 
income 
Financially 
constrained 
Non-
financially 
constrained 
Net financial wealth           
Including assets in 
pension accounts 
0.91*** 
(0.15) 
0.77***
(0.20) 
0.83*** 
(0.27) 
0.93*** 
(0.20) 
0.85 
(0.84) 
Excluding assets in 
pension accounts 
–0.19** 
(0.10) 
0.09 
(0.11) 
–0.30** 
(0.12) 
–0.08 
(0.09) 
–0.38** 
(0.18) 
Implied effect on 
pension assets 
1.10  0.69  1.12 1.02 1.23 
Net wealth           
Including assets in 
pension accounts 
1.33 
(1.02) 
0.71 
(0.53) 
0.88 
(0.61) 
0.34 
(0.46) 
0.99 
(0.80) 
Excluding assets in 
pension accounts 
–0.41 
(0.36) 
–0.28 
(0.45) 
–0.91 
(0.41) 
–0.79 
(0.36) 
–0.77 
(0.77) 
Implied effect on 
pension assets 
1.74 0.99  1.79  1.13 1.76 
Notes:  Standard errors are in brackets. *** and ** represent significance at the 1 and 5 per cent levels, 
respectively. Top-coded net wealth and gross income observations have been excluded. 
 
The results for the sub-samples show that the effect of an extra dollar in 
compulsory pension accounts on net financial wealth is largest for financially 
constrained households, whose financial wealth increases by 93 cents for every 
extra dollar in their compulsory pension accounts. In contrast, the effect on non-
financially constrained households is smaller at 85 cents and is not statistically 
significant (the difference between the two estimates is also likely to be 
statistically insignificant). This is consistent with our expectations, since 
financially constrained households would have less opportunity to reduce holdings 
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of other assets to offset compulsory saving. The marginal effect of compulsory 
contributions on net financial wealth for above-median-income households is   
83 cents, close to the effect for below-median-income households of 77 cents. In 
particular, above-median-income households (and non-financially constrained 
households as well) appear to have a larger stock of non-pension saving with 
which to offset compulsory contributions. Their financial wealth excluding pension 
assets falls by 30 cents for every extra dollar in compulsory pension accounts, 
while the non-pension assets of below-median-income households are not 
significantly affected. Interestingly, compulsory contributions appear to have more 
than a dollar-for-dollar effect on the pension assets of above-median-income 
households (and those households who are non-financially constrained). This result 
may be due to high-income earners making voluntary pension contributions to take 
advantage of their concessional tax treatment. 
Overall, it would be reasonable to characterise the results in Table 4 as suggesting 
that household wealth increases by around 70 to 90 cents for every extra dollar in 
compulsory pension accounts, with the effect most pronounced for financially 
constrained households. This is broadly consistent with our expectations as 
outlined in the introduction. 
4.2  Voluntary Saving for Retirement 
Receiving compulsory pension contributions appears to have a positive influence 
on the propensity of households to voluntarily save for their retirement in pension 
accounts. The results of a probit model on whether households make voluntary 
contributions (Equation  (3)) are presented in Table 5. For all the samples, the 
probability of making a voluntary contribution increases when households receive 
compulsory pension contributions and the effect is statistically significant at the  
5 per cent level. In the full sample, the probability of making voluntary 
contributions is 19 per cent higher if the household receives compulsory 
contributions. 
It is somewhat surprising that the effect on voluntary retirement saving is positive, 
since we would expect households to first offset compulsory contributions in 
pension accounts by reducing voluntary contributions. It is possible that 
compulsory pension contributions lead to higher voluntary pension contributions 
by highlighting the importance of retirement saving and making it more 
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convenient. This result is similar to findings for the United States by Madrian and 
Shea (2001), where households are more likely to voluntarily save in pension 
accounts if they are automatically enrolled by their employer.15 Nevertheless, 
households could still offset their retirement saving by reducing non-pension 
wealth, such as housing equity or other investments. 
Table 5: Effect of Compulsory Contributions on Voluntary Retirement Saving
Marginal effect, per cent 
 Full   
sample 
Below-
median 
income 
Above-
median 
income 
Financially 
constrained 
Non-
financially 
constrained 
Whether make voluntary 
contributions  18.6***  14.7*** 15.5** 17.1*** 19.5*** 
Voluntary contributions as 
per cent of labour income  1.5***  0.9*** 1.7** 0.8*** 2.0*** 
Notes:  The marginal effect is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. *** and ** represent
significance at the 1 and 5 per cent levels, respectively, for the test of the underlying coefficient being 0. 
 
To quantify the effect on voluntary retirement saving, Table 5 also presents the 
results of a tobit model where the regressand is the size of voluntary contributions 
as a per cent of income. The marginal effect of compulsory contributions is to 
increase voluntary contributions by around 1.5 per cent of income in the full 
sample. The marginal effect is estimated to be around 1 per cent of income for 
below-median-income and financially constrained households, compared with 
closer to 2  per cent for above-median-income and non-financially constrained 
households, implying that financial constraints do, to some extent, restrict the 
ability of households to save more for retirement. 
The magnitude of the effect across the samples appears small but is economically 
significant, particularly if the extra 1.5 per cent of saving each year occurs 
throughout the working life of the household. Under conservative assumptions 
regarding investment returns on assets in these accounts, over a 40-year working 
life, this extra saving would cumulate after tax so as to increase the wealth of the 
                                           
15 Covick (2002) suggested that means-testing arrangements on social security programs could 
also help to explain why some households may choose to voluntarily save more for retirement 
in response to a compulsory saving scheme. 
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household by 75 per cent of pre-retirement income.16 Assuming a replacement rate 
of 40 per cent of pre-retirement income, this extra saving would fully fund around 
2 years of retirement. Over a 25-year retirement period, this would boost the 
replacement rate by around 5 percentage points. 
4.3  Retirement Intentions 
Table 6 presents results for the estimated effect of compulsory contributions on the 
average retirement intentions of households where at least one household member 
is still working and aged between 45 and 64. First, I find that households who 
receive compulsory contributions are no more likely to report an intended age of 
retirement (Equation (4)). Of the households where at least one member specified 
an intended age of retirement, receiving compulsory contributions did not have a 
significant effect on the average intended age of retirement (Equation (5)). These 
results are broadly consistent whether or not households were below the median 
income or were financially constrained. 
Table 6: Effect of Compulsory Pension Coverage on Retirement Intentions 
Marginal effect 
  Full  
sample 
Below-
median 
income 
Above-
median 
income 
Financially 
constrained 
Non-
financially 
constrained 
Whether have retirement 
intentions (per cent) 
–1.4 
 
–6.0 
 
0.5 
 
–0.2 
 
–5.7 
 
Age intend to retire (years)  1.3  2.4*  –0.5  0.9  1.2 
Notes:  The marginal effect is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. * represents significance at the 
10 per cent level for the test of the underlying coefficient being 0. 
 
These results suggest that compulsory pension contributions do not have a 
significant effect on the retirement intentions of households. This is somewhat 
surprising given the importance of these contributions to retirement incomes. It is 
possible that the Superannuation Guarantee is affecting retirement intentions in 
several ways that could possibly be offsetting each other. For instance, the increase 
in net wealth due to compulsory pension accounts could bring forward the 
retirement age of households, assuming leisure is a normal good. However, these 
                                           
16 Assuming that nominal labour income grows by 4 per cent, nominal returns to pension funds 
average 7 per cent and that contributions and returns are taxed at 15 per cent. 
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households may decide to delay retirement if the Superannuation Guarantee makes 
them aware that they need to save more to achieve their desired standard of living 
in retirement. 
There are some caveats that should be taken into account when interpreting this 
result. In particular, it should be noted that household members aged over 45 in 
2002/03 would have only been exposed to compulsory pension contributions for a 
fraction of their working life, while younger household members will be exposed 
to the system for their entire working life. Therefore this result may not be so 
relevant to the wider working population. Also, it is possible that retirement 
intentions are a poor indicator of when households will actually retire, as many 
household members may not have planned their retirement in detail at this stage. 
4.4  Robustness Tests using Matching Estimators 
An alternative way of estimating the effect of compulsory pension contributions on 
household saving behaviour is to use matching estimators. The technique is 
analogous to using the covariates, Xi, in the models in Section 2 to find a ‘financial 
twin’ for each household not receiving compulsory contributions from the group of 
households receiving contributions.17 After obtaining the closest match for each 
household not receiving compulsory contributions, the effect of the 
Superannuation Guarantee on household wealth, retirement saving and retirement 
intentions can be calculated. 
The results are presented in Appendix A, Tables A2 and A3, and suggest that the 
regression results presented above are broadly robust to the use of this alternative 
estimation technique. In particular, compulsory pension contributions appear to 
have a sizeable effect on household net financial wealth and net total wealth. 
Households receiving compulsory contributions also appear more likely to 
voluntarily save for retirement in pension accounts. The only significant difference 
with the regression results above is that households receiving contributions intend 
to retire later when the matching estimator is used. 
                                           
17 See Abadie et al (2004). 
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5.  Conclusions 
Australia’s experience with compulsory pension accounts is a useful case study 
since the reforms have been operating for over 15 years. This paper finds that 
Australia’s pension accounts increased household wealth, with an extra dollar in 
their compulsory pension accounts adding between 70 and 90 cents to household 
wealth. This result is consistent with some households facing financial constraints 
that prevent them from fully offsetting the compulsory contributions employers 
make on their behalf by reducing other assets or borrowing. Voluntary saving for 
retirement also appeared to increase slightly. This result may be due to the 
Superannuation Guarantee making households more aware of the need to save for 
retirement, or the added convenience of being able to make contributions directly 
into pension accounts set up by their employer. Finally, empirical estimates 
suggest that there is no significant effect on intentions regarding the timing of 
retirement. These results suggest that compulsory pension accounts can increase 
household saving and expected retirement incomes. 
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Appendix A: Tables of Results 
Table A1: Compulsory Pension Coverage and Saving Behaviour 
Marginal effect, per cent 
 Full   
sample 
Below 
median 
income 
Above 
median 
income 
Financially 
constrained 
Not 
financially 
constrained 
Whether saving  6.8**  6.8*  3.6  6.6*  3.8 
Saving for education  –2.0  –1.5  3.1  –3.4  0.4 
Saving for family reasons  2.3  1.0  2.5  1.6  5.9 
Saving for home  5.3  1.1  15.2**  3.2  10.8 
Saving for retirement  8.1*  5.7  9.1  4.4  8.5 
Saving for ill 
health/emergencies 
–0.8 –3.6 8.2  –5.1 11.4 
Saving for future/no reason  6.6*  4.9  6.8  4.4  7.2 
Time horizon for saving 
greater than 5 years 
0.2 –1.1 3.9  –2.7  4.0 
Above-average financial 
risk-taking 
–4.2 –1.9  –12.0  –1.1  –23.7*** 
Notes:  The marginal effect is for discrete change of dummy variable measuring compulsory pension coverage 
from 0 to 1. Other factors affecting saving, outlined in Section 2.5, have been controlled for. ***, ** and 
* represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively, for the test of the underlying 
coefficient being 0. 
 
Table A2: Effect of Compulsory Pension Contributions on  
Household Wealth to Gross Income Ratio 
Full sample, median treatment effect 
  Regression Matching  estimator 
Financial wealth    
Including assets in pension accounts  20.3  48.9 
Excluding assets in pension accounts  4.4  12.7 
Implied effect on pension assets  15.9  36.2 
Net wealth     
Including assets in pension accounts  46.7  28.5 
Excluding assets in pension accounts  4.2  –2.9 
Implied effect on pension assets  42.5  31.4 
Note:  Standard errors have not been calculated for the median matching estimator. 
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Table A3: Effect of Compulsory Pension Contributions on  
Voluntary Saving for Retirement and the Timing of Retirement 
Full sample, average treatment effect 
 Regression  Matching  estimator 
Whether make voluntary 
contributions 
18.6*** 10.7*** 
Voluntary contributions as  
per cent of labour income 
1.5*** 0.9* 
Whether have retirement 
intentions 
–1.4 –3.2 
Age intend to retire (years)  1.3  5.2*** 
Note:  *** and * represent significance at the 1 and 10 per cent levels, respectively.  
 
2
5
Table A4: Model of Net Financial Wealth 
 Coefficient  Standard  error      Coefficient  Standard error 
Compulsory super contributions    0.91***   0.15    Retail trade    58.49    4 893.76 
Compulsory super contributions & self-employed    –0.38    0.65    Hospitality    3 957.06    5 269.38 
Self-employed  38 239.85**  15 457.97    Transport & storage    3 283.80    10 532.51 
Age    –3 448.46***   1 310.07    Communication    28 862.37*    17 419.80 
Age
2    59.92***   17.54    Finance & insurance    9 327.89    10 377.75 
Gender    –603.35    3 359.91    Property & business services    3 940.05    7 352.46 
Persons in household    1 511.99    4 930.28    Government & defence    29 715.37**   12 433.54 
Persons in household
2    –75.08    675.75  Education   15  763.10*    9  275.01 
Household disposable income    0.10    0.25    Health care & community services    –5 752.06    6 583.16 
Household disposable income
2   7.73×10
–6***
   2.52×10
–6    Cultural & recreational services    –1 435.59    8 763.11 
Years employed    179.10    973.62    Personal & other services    7 084.61    7 564.81 
Years employed
2    59.24**    24.95    Regional    6 387.86    4 635.50 
Health condition    5 611.67    6 239.80    Outer regional    8 893.68    9 302.66 
Health condition affecting work    –8 289.60    7 930.21    Remote    12 454.03    12 433.45 
Job security    –36.47    153.14    Very remote    21 716.26    21 521.39 
Job security
2    –1.19    2.24    NSW other than Sydney    1 185.60    5 766.65 
Finished high school only    16 259.02***   4 145.47    Melbourne    3 401.67    3 783.38 
Finished degree    15 610.21***   5 182.85    Rest of Vic    6 269.09    6 716.18 
Finished diploma only    13 866.49***   3 501.26    Brisbane    1 456.78    4 283.72 
Married    –1 183.68    4 190.40    Rest of Qld    –3 308.02    4 934.84 
Divorced  –25 599.47***   4 987.74    Adelaide    –3 091.47    5 788.47 
Widowed   –28 751.74*    15 046.15    Rest of SA    –7 027.52    8 833.35 
De facto  –13 407.14***   4 564.14    Perth    –786.37    5 492.58 
Agriculture, forestry & fishing    3 062.69    9 660.75    Rest of WA    –14 512.94    10 906.46 
Mining    29 010.77    18 539.55    Tas    –964.81    7 606.57 
Utilities  87 567.48**    39 030.13    NT    9 875.42    35 617.71 
Construction    –5 728.81    6 209.44    Canberra    14 460.36    17 069.42 
Wholesale trade    –239.85***   6 173.07    Constant    22 435.35    20 228.94 
Notes: The  Pseudo  R
2 is 0.18. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively. 26 
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